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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for
monetary policy. Inter alia, the changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly
changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the first part of the Treaty as
one of the “other institutions and advisory bodies”. Possibly more importantly, the euro area as
such will be in the position to act legally as itself within the European Union (EU) legal
structures. The Eurogroup also will be officially recognized (“Euro-Ecofin-Council”). President
Jean-Claude Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by
including the bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk that EU member states could
formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, but may also lead to more central bank
conservatism with the ECB as explained in our analysis. In this paper we analyze the trade-off
between central bank independence and conservatism with New Keynesian framework
following Woodford [Woodford, M., 2003. Interest and prices: foundations of a theory of
monetary policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.] and others. Our conclusion is that the
trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism still holds within the New
Keynesian framework. Politicians should therefore realize that their attempts to downgrade
ECB's independence legally and verbally will only increase its conservatism in order to maintain
the same inflationary bias and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its interest
rate policy.





















The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for monetary policy. Inter alia, the
changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the
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three-pillar structure of the EU, more democracy, change of the institutional setup of the Union, improvement of the solidarity and
security within the Union and enhancement of the position of the EU on the global stage (European Commission, July 10, 2007).
The three-pillar structure will be abolished, as to simplify the structure of the EU. The structure will be reorganized, with more
emphasis on foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. More democracy is realized by giving national parliaments
and the European Parliament (EP) a bigger say, while the power of the European Commission (EC) will decrease. The EP will be on
equal footing with the Council of Ministers in many areas in terms of decision making. Also, a withdrawal option will be included,
as to state that member states are part of the EU by their own choosing. The change in the institutional set-up of the ECB will be
most important for the working of monetary policy and the status of the ECB. The latter effects will be singled out later in the text
and treated in more detail. Furthermore, decisionmaking will be mademore swiftly andmore commonly supported by the system
of qualified majority voting, which will be introduced in more than forty new areas. This is also going to apply to economic
governance. These measures include the giving up of veto power in many areas (including the ECB's powers over financial
regulation), the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council, and a reinforcement of the Commission's
authority. Also, as will be clear later on, it is easier to amend the treaty in the new form, by means of co-decision and qualified
majority voting, so that a new IGC will not be necessary.
Although Article 108 of the Treaty still states that “neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, nor any
member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of
a Member State or from any other body”, the fact that the ECB will be grouped with institutions such as the EC and the EP makes
that its special status may or will be affected. This may have consequences for the functioning of the ECB in conducting effective
monetary policy. The grouping of the ECB with other EU institutions will affect its independence and must be considered as an
extremely dangerous development.
In this paper we will argue that a Thomas Becket effect is likely to occur after a reduction of central bank independence.1 Once
appointed as a central banker, officials learn to behave like an independent central banker. Faced with the reduction in their
independence, they develop a more conservative attitude and become like Wim Duisenberg's “whipped cream”: the more
politicians stir them, the stiffer they become.2 We argue that it is optimal for society to select central bankers that have the right
degree of conservatism (given the present level of independence) and have the “whipped cream” property that makes themmore
conservative, if and when the level of independence is reduced. Both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream”
characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) appointed members of the Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most
remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion of Treaty reform including the change of the institutional set-up and the
grouping of the ECB in the first part of the Treaty as one of the “other institutions and advisory bodies”. President Trichet's concern
about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by including the central bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk
that EUmember states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, but may also lead to more central bank conservatism
with the ECB as will be explained by our analysis.
Section 2 discusses briefly the time inconsistency problem and the rationale for central bank independence based on Rogoff
(1985) and others. In Section 3 we analyze whether there exists a trade-off between independence and conservatismwithin a New
Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
2. The rationale for central bank independence
The Maastricht Treaty has made the ECB very independent. Nowadays is it widely believed that a high level of central bank
independence and an explicit mandate for the bank to deliver a low and stable rate of inflation are important institutional devices
to assure price stability. It is thought that an independent central bank can give full priority to low levels of inflation. In countries
with a more dependent central bank other considerations (notably, re-election perspectives of politicians and a low level of
unemployment) may interfere with the objective of price stability. In that context the German central bank is often mentioned as
an example. The Deutsche Bundesbank was relatively autonomous; at the same time, Germany had one of the best post-Second
WorldWar inflation records among the OECD countries. Indeed, the statutes of the ECB are largelymodeled after the law governing
the Bundesbank. Why would central bank independence, ceteris paribus, yield lower rates of inflation? The theoretical reasoning
in this field stresses the time inconsistency problem (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,1983). The basic idea behind
the time-inconsistency problem can be explained as follows. Suppose, the policy maker announces a certain inflation rate that (s)
he considers optimal. If private sector agents take this announced inflation rate into account in their behavior, it becomes at that
time optimal for the government to renege and to create a higher than announced inflation rate. The reason for this is that a burst
of unexpected inflation yields certain benefits. For instance, unexpected inflation reduces real wages, thereby increasing
employment. Of course, this is only part of the story. The next step is to add rational expectations. Under rational expectations
economic agents know government's incentive to create unexpected inflation and take this into account in forming their
expectations. Government has no other choice than to vindicate these. It is clear that the inflation rate will be higher than under
the situation in which government would stick to its promise. No matter which factors exactly cause the dynamic inconsistency
problem, in all cases the resulting rate of inflation is sub-optimal. So in the literature devices have been suggested to reduce this so-U1 The Thomas Becket effect was coined by the first and former Chief Economist of the ECB, Otmar Issing, and expresses the fact that it takes time for a centra
banker to learn to behave independently from politics.
2 This comparison was introduced by the first and former President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, who stated (in Dutch): “Centrale bankiers zijn als slagroom
hoe meer je in ze roert, hoe stijver ze worden”.
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F
called inflationary bias. Rogoff (1985) has proposed to delegate monetary policy to an independent and ‘conservative’ central
banker. Conservative means that the central banker is more averse to inflation than the government, in the sense that he places a
greater weight on price stability than the government does. Why would a central banker be more inflation averse than the
government? Two main differences have been pointed out in the literature between preferences of the government and those of
the central bank (see Cukierman,1992). One relates to possible differences in the time preference of political authorities and that of
central banks. For various reasons, central banks tend to take a longer view of the policy process than do politicians. The other
difference concerns the subjective weights in the objective function of the central bank and that of government officials. It is often
assumed that central bankers are relatively more concerned about inflation than about other policy goals such as achieving high
employment levels and adequate government revenues. If monetary policy is set at the discretion of a ‘conservative’ and
independent central banker, a lower average time-consistent inflation rate will result. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) analyzed
the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism within the traditional Lucas supply framework with rational
expectations and concluded that this trade-off between independence and conservatism exists. We will now analyze whether this
conclusion still holds within a New Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. In this framework, we abstract
from the inflationary bias and the time-inconsistency problem tomotivate central bank conservatism. Instead, we assume that the
government has a relatively stronger preference for stabilization of the output gap than society as a whole.
3. The trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism within a New Keynesian framework
The forward-looking New Keynesian model is the standard workhorse model for monetary policy analysis. This model, with a
forward-looking Phillips curve (or aggregate supply function) and a forward-looking IS-curve (or aggregate demand function),
provides realistic interactions between nominal and real variables in the economy. The two base equations are derived from
optimizing behavior by the forward-looking agents that live in the economy with sticky prices and. On top of that, we introduce
two policymakers (called government and central bank) who influence monetary policy. Monetary policy is set after the two
policymakers have bargained over the appropriate monetary policy rule.








consPRxt ¼ Etxtþ1−σ it−Etπtþ1−rnt  ð1Þπt ¼ βEtπtþ1 þ κxt þ ut ð2Þxt is the period t output gap, Etxt+1 the current period expectation of next period's output gap, σ is the interest elasticity of
149
150
151Dwherethe output gap, it the current period nominal interest rate, Etπt+1 the current period expectation of next period's inflation rate, rtnthe neutral real interest rate in period t, β the discount factor, κ the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap and ut a supply shock(cost push shock). The monetary policy maker fully controls the short-term nominal interest rate it. The micro-foundations of themodel imply that σ, κN0 and 0bβb1.
For society as a whole, the welfare theoretic loss function is of the form:155
157EC
TEW ¼ E0 ∑∞t¼0 βtLt  ð3Þ
β is again the discount factor and the per period loss function is given by:
Lt ¼ πtð Þ2þλ xt−xð Þ2 ð4Þ
x⁎ is a certain optimal level for the output gap and λ is the weight attached to output gap stabilization relative to inflation158
159
161Rwherestabilization. Woodford (2003) justifies the convenient and widely assumed specification of the quadratic loss function (4) byshowing that it represents a second-order Taylor series approximation of the representative household's expected utility.Woodford (2003) also derives an optimal weight on output stabilization λ⁎ that depends on the structural parameters of the
model. The two policymakers that are relevant for the way interest rates are set, the government and the central bank are
characterized by the following one period loss functions:163
1656ORLGt ¼ πtð Þ2þλG xt−xð Þ2 ð5ÞLCBt ¼ πtð Þ2þλCB xt−xð Þ2 ð6Þ
superscript G indicates the government and superscript CB indicates the central bank. The only difference between these167
168
169
170NCwheretwo loss functions and the loss function for society as awhole lies in theweight that is attached to stabilization of the output gap. Inthis model, we suppose that the government, for political reasons, is more concerned about deviations in the output gap thansociety. So, it attaches a higher weight to stabilization of the output gap than society does (λGNλ⁎), which is suboptimal for social
welfare.3 Ue that the target for the output gap (x⁎) is the same for the central bank and the government. This implies that the economy does not suffer from an
ary bias, in equilibrium, independent of the central bank's independence or conservatism. There may be good reasons to assume that the government
aims for a higher output gap. By abstracting from an ambitious output target for the government, we bias our model against central bank conservatism
ependence. Introducing a government with a higher target for the output gap would strengthen our results.
e cite this article as: Eijffinger, S.C.W., Hoeberichts, M.M., The trade-off between central bank independence and
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policy. The central bank faces pressure from the government about the weight that should be given to the objective of output
stabilization. The strength of the central bank in the negotiations with the government, or her independence from politicians, is
captured parameter γ, with 0bγ≤1. The loss function that effectively governs monetary policy is a weighted average of the central
bank's loss function and the government's loss function with weights γ and 1−γ attached to the central bank and to the
government, respectively.178
Plea
consLPt ¼ 1−γð ÞLGt þ γLCBt ¼ πtð Þ2þ 1−γð ÞλG þ γλCB
h i
xt−xð Þ2 ð7Þ
the remainder of the paper the optimal levels for inflation and the output gap have been set at zero, both for the central bank
180
181In
and the government. This implies that our results hold even if the government does not suffer from an inflationary bias.
Introducing a positive bias for the government would only strengthen our results. Setting the target values at zero, andminimizing
the loss function subject to the Phillips curve, we get the following optimal targeting rule for monetary policy:185xt ¼ − κ
1−γð ÞλG þ γλCB πt ð8Þ
















FThcentral bank and also given theweight that both policymakers have in determining themonetary policy loss function (7), targetingrule (8) is the best policy rule that can be implemented. This targeting rule implies that the central bank should set nominal
interest rates in such a way that the output gapmoves in an opposite direction as inflation, scaled by the slope of the Phillips curve
κ divided by the “effective” weight on stabilization of the output gap (1−γ)λG+γλCB. If this preference for output stabilization is
very high, the coefficient on inflation in Eq. (8) is very low, which means that the cost-push shocks ut will mostly affect inflation
and will hardly be stabilized by letting the output gap fluctuate. The opposite will happen if the preference for output stabilization
is very low.
This policy can be implemented when the monetary policymaker set its short-term nominal interest rate i according to a Taylor
rule. This rule implies that the short-term nominal interest rate moves with inflation and the output gap, with the weights φπ and
φx optimally chosen: it= i⁎+φπ(πt)+φx(xt−x⁎). It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive an exact mapping between the optimal
weights in the optimal Taylor rule and the optimal targeting rule, but it can be done.
In the institutional design stage, society knows the degree of independence γ that is granted to the central bank as well as the
preferences of the government. Its task, at this stage, is to pick a central banker with such preferences that the effective weight on
stabilization of the output gap is in line with society's optimal weight. To ensure this, society should select a central banker with
the following preference for output stabilization:203EDλCB ¼ λG−λG−λγ or γε ¼ λG−λ with ε ¼ λG−λCB ð9Þ

























TInattaches too much weight to output stabilization (λGNλ⁎), society selects the central bank that compensates by being conservative
in the sense that she puts relative more weight on inflation stabilization rather than output stabilization. The equation above also
shows that the central bank needs to be more conservative, the less independent it is (so, the lower γ). So, if the government
interferes a lot in the formulation of monetary policy, it will encounter a more conservative central bank. If, on the other hand, the
central bank is completely independent (γ=1) and determines monetary policy without any interference from the government, it
is optimal for society to simply pick a central banker whose preference for output stabilization is equal to the optimal value derived
by Woodford (2003), so (λCBNλ⁎). The less independence the central bank has (low γ) and the more excessive weight politicians
attach to stabilization of the output gap (λGNλ⁎), the more conservative the central bank has to be in order to conduct optimal
monetary policy.
4. Policy implications of the trade-off between independence and conservatism
In other words, delegating monetary policy to an independent and ‘conservative’ central bank will reduce the variability of
inflation and improve welfare. There is an optimal level of independence cum conservatism (γɛ⁎). Under certain assumptions, this
is shown graphically in Fig. 1. Optimal means that the loss function of the society (Eq. (3)) is minimized.
It also follows from Eq. (9) that both independence and the inflation aversion of the central bank matter. If the central banker
has the same inflation aversion as government (i.e. ɛ=0), the independence does not matter. And similarly, if the central bank is
fully under the spell of government (i.e. γ=0), the conservatism of the central bank does not matter. There are various
combinations of γ and ɛ that may yield the same outcome, including the optimal one. We can illustrate this in Fig. 2.
From a practical point the concept of a ‘conservative’ central banker seems, however, void, if only since the preferences of
possible candidates for positions in the governing board of a central bank are generally not very easy to identify and may change
after they have been appointed. So, it is hard to find some real world example of a ‘conservative’ central banker. Still, one could
argue that the statute of the central bank could be relevant here, especially with respect to the question of whether or not it defines
price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy. Whether or not the statute of a central bank defines price stability as these cite this article as: Eijffinger, S.C.W., Hoeberichts, M.M., The trade-off between central bank independence and





Fig. 1. The optimal level of central bank independence and conservatism.
Fig. 2. Trade-off between conservatism and independence of a central bank.
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Fprimary policy goal, can be considered as a proxy for the ‘conservative bias’ of the central bank as embodied in the law (seeCukierman, 1992).
In the institutional design stage of the ECB, when its statutes were drawn up, the ECB was granted a very high degree of
independence (γ close to 1). This arrangement allowed the ECB to have the best of both worlds by having preferences close to the
social optimum (λCB close λ⁎, see Eq. (9)) and still be a credible inflation fighter. It is also obvious from Fig. 2 that if the
independence granted to the ECB was going to be reduced (lower γ), it would be optimal to appoint more a conservative central
banker (higher ε, lower λCB). The reduction in independence combinedwith an increase in conservatism ensures that society shifts
along the optimal curve in Fig. 2. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. It is in the interest of society to appoint a monetary policy maker endowed with the optimal combination of
independence and conservatism vis-à-vis the government. It is also in the interest of society that this policy maker, when faced with a
reduction of its independence, becomes more conservative.
Proof. Starting from the optimal (middle) curve in Fig. 2, lower independence pushes society to the left of the optimal curve and
makes it worse of. An increase in conservatism pushes society upwards and back to the optimal curve.
However, it can be argued that the monetary policy makers (or the members of the Governing Council in the case of the ECB)
are still the same people, with the same preferences. Moreover, when their term ends they will be replaced by a new member,
selected by the same government(s) that weakened the independence of the central bank. In practice, however, the Thomas Becket
effect is likely to occur after a reduction of central bank independence. Once appointed as a central banker, officials learn to behave
like an independent central banker. Facedwith the reduction in their independence, they develop amore conservative attitude and
become like Wim Duisenberg's “whipped cream”: the more politicians stir them, the stiffer they become. We argue that it is
optimal for society to select central bankers that have the right degree of conservatism (given the present level of independence)
and have the “whipped cream” property that makes them more conservative, if and when the level of independence is reduced.
Both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream” characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) appointedmembers of the






























































the change of the institutional set-up and the grouping of the ECB in the first part of the Treaty as one of the “other institutions and
advisory bodies”. President Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by including the
central bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk that EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB,
but may also lead to more central bank conservatism with the ECB as explained by our analysis.
5. Concluding remarks
So from a theoretical point of view it can be argued that an independent and conservative central bank improves the social
welfare implications of monetary policy and ensures optimal stabilization policy in a world where the government puts too much
emphasis on stabilization of the output gap. Moreover, the trade off between central bank independence and conservatism enables
the central bank to continue implementing optimal monetary policy even after its independence is reduced, by becoming more
conservative. If a government, for political reasons, decides to limit the central bank's independence, it is in the interest of society
that this is countered by a more conservative central bank. This holds under the ceteris paribus assumption that society's
preferences do not change.
What about the empirical evidence? A substantial amount of empirical research supports the inverse relationship between
central bank independence and the level of inflation (see also Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996 for a review). The negative relationship
between indicators of central bank independence and inflation in OECD countries is quite robust, also if various control variables
are included in the regression. Still, it should be noted that a negative correlation does not necessarily imply causation. The
correlation between both variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and tradition of monetary stability in a
country. However, sometimes central bank independence is a condition sine qua non to establish the culture and tradition of
monetary stability in a country (e.g. in France).
President Jean-Claude Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by including the bank in
a list of EU institutions there is a risk that EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB is not only true,
but may also lead to more conservatism (inflation aversion) with the ECB. Central bankers are like Duisenberg's “whipping cream”
faced with the reduction in their independence, they develop a more conservative attitude.
As we argued above both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream” characteristic are perceptible with the (newly)
appointed members of the Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion
of Treaty reform. President Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by including the central
bank in a list of EU institutions may also lead to more central bank conservatism with the ECB as explained by our analysis.
Politicians should realize that their attempts to downgrade ECB's independence legally and verbally will only increase its
conservatism in order to maintain the same monetary policy stance and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its
interest rate policy. The consequences of these attempts are relative higher interest rates in the eurozone, being exactly the
opposite of what they wish to achieve.
Sometimes it is better to tie yourself, like Odysseus, to the mast to resist the siren voice.
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